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INTRODUCTION 
The growth of charter schools as a prominent educational reform 
strategy nationwide and within the majority of states has turned the 
attention of scholars and policymakers to the issue of charter quality.1  
While the academic performance of charter schools is, in the 
                                                                                                                 
* Kelsey W. Mayo is a Ph.D. candidate in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy 
Program at Berkeley Law School and a 2014 National Academy of 
Education/Spencer Foundation Dissertation Fellow.  This research is supported by 
the National Science Foundation, the National Academy of Education/Spencer 
Foundation, and by the Center for the Study of Law and Society at the University of 
California, Berkeley.  Special thanks to Calvin Morrill and Michael Taylor for helpful 
comments on drafts of this Article. 
 1. PRISCILLA WOHLSTETTER ET AL., CHOICES AND CHANGES: CHARTER SCHOOL 
PERFORMANCE IN PERSPECTIVE (Harvard Educ. Press, 2013). 
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aggregate, on par with that of traditional public schools,2 this finding 
is complicated by the fundamental decentralization of the 
organizational environment of education and its oversight.  The 
charter landscape boasts distinct charter authorizers across hundreds 
of state and local jurisdictions, a still-evolving federal policy; 
significant internal diversity, both in school organizational type and 
quality; and high levels of political advocacy and philanthropic 
activity.  Non-renewal and revocation measures, common 
administrative actions to ensure baseline charter quality, are not 
uniformly applied across jurisdictions.3  When these measures are 
employed, they take place within a complicated legal environment 
and densely populated social field.4 
While scholars have examined the legal requirements of charter 
oversight policies and the regulatory relationships between charter 
schools and their authorizers,5 they have glossed over the importance 
of these oversight fora, and have thus failed to consider the 
implications of a discretionary and ambiguous law on the 
development of sound and equitable charter policy within states and 
local districts.  This Article emerges from a larger project examining 
the role of law in the processes of charter oversight in California, the 
state with the largest and most diverse population of charter schools 
in the nation.6  While the project directly engages only one state’s 
experience with charter schools, California’s nearly twenty-five year 
history with the organizational form and well-developed charter 
organizational environment make it a consequential site of study,7 
particularly for states and policymakers interested in improving 
charter school performance and oversight structures. 
To orient the reader, I review the charter oversight and 
accountability processes in California in Part I, and provide 
justification for a sociolegal approach to studying these actions.  Next, 
in Part II, I treat the broader legal environment in question, focusing 
                                                                                                                 
 2. CAROLINE M. HOXBY, ACHIEVEMENT IN CHARTER SCHOOLS AND REGULAR 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES (2004). 
 3. Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Charter School Accountability: Legal Considerations 
Concerning Nonrenewal and Revocation Procedures, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 551, 
580 (2006). 
 4. Id. at 558–80. 
 5. See Sandra Vergari, The Regulatory Styles of Statewide Charter School 
Authorizers: Arizona, Massachusetts, and Michigan, 36 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 730 (2000). 
 6. The Condition of Education: Charter School Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgb.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 
2015). 
 7. See generally RON ZIMMER ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOL OPERATIONS AND 
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA (2003). 
2015] CHARTER SCHOOL OVERSIGHT 673 
on the spaces of charter authorization and oversight as dynamic sites 
of law in action.  Drawing on three sources of data—(1) the California 
Department of Education’s database of traditional public and charter 
schools,8 (2) interviews with charter operators, lawyers, and charter 
advocates, and (3) analysis of charter documents and local school 
board proceedings—I identify and examine four legal aspects that 
emerge from the structure of charter oversight and the participation 
of school operators, local authorizers, and charter school advocates.  
In Part III, the findings section, I trace these four aspects 
(compliance-related, legitimating, aspirational, and democratic legal 
strands) through the bureaucratic structures and processes of charter 
school oversight.  Discussion thus moves beyond the “black box” of 
school board decision-making concerning charter school reforms, 
connecting charter oversight to themes in regulatory law and 
democratic participation in administrative rulemaking. 
The Article concludes by considering implications of a multivalent 
and often ambiguous legal environment for effective regimes of 
charter oversight.  While the research contributes to the practical 
development of sound and equitable charter authorization and 
oversight policies, it is also an endeavor of legal sociology—
disentangling the multiple threads of law in an increasingly complex 
educational field.9 
I.  CHARTER OVERSIGHT IN CALIFORNIA 
Charter schools are publicly funded, tuition-free schools that 
operate according to the provisions of a charter granted by a legally 
recognized authorizer.10  Charter authorizers oversee charter schools 
within their jurisdiction—their powers include initial approval, 
renewal, and revocation, and provide funding streams and, often, 
facilities for approved charters.11  Following the Charter Schools Act 
of 1992,12 California became the second state, after Minnesota, to 
permit charters, and as of 2014, the charter school population 
numbered 1180 schools, the largest in the nation and nearly eleven 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Public Schools Database, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/si/ds/
pubschls.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 9. See Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School 
Statutes that Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 370 
(2003). 
 10. The Condition of Education: Charter School Enrollment, supra note 6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47600–47604.5 (West 2013). 
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percent of all public schools in the state.13  Fifty-four of California’s 
fifty-eight counties have charter options, and charters now serve more 
than 500,000 students, approximately seven percent of public school 
enrollment in the state.14  Although introduction of the charter form 
remains a contentious political issue in many local districts and 
counties, as a matter of state policy California has embraced the 
aspirational statement of its legislature that charter schools are, and 
should remain, an integral component of the K–12 educational 
landscape.15  It is now reasonable to assume that charter schools and 
their political advocates are permanent features of the state’s 
educational system.  Inquiry into charter quality and the legal context 
of oversight is thus a timely endeavor, and one that follows recent 
shifts toward market forms in the educational field.  In order to 
understand the legal cast of charter school accountability, this section 
first outlines the structure of charter oversight in California. 
A. Charter School Authorizers 
The California Education Code grants three entities the power to 
authorize and oversee charter schools: boards of local school districts, 
county school boards, and the State Board of Education.16  As of 
2014, there were 332 distinct charter authorizers in operation; the 
majority (282) were local school districts.17  Thirty-five county offices 
of education also authorized charters; only fifteen schools (or school 
networks) received authorization directly from the State Board.18  
The presumption of local control is also reflected in patterns of initial 
petitions: local school districts receive the vast majority of initial 
charter petitions, while schools applying to counties or the State 
Board for initial authorization must provide compelling evidence in 
the original petition as to why county or state oversight is more 
suitable than control by the local school district.19  Common reasons 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Public Schools Database, supra note 8. 
 14. Id. 
 15. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b) (West 2013) (“In reviewing petitions for the 
establishment of charter schools pursuant to this section, the chartering authority 
shall be guided by the intent of the Legislature that charter schools are and should 
become an integral part of the California educational system and that establishment 
of charter schools should be encouraged.”). 
 16. Id. §§ 47605(a)(1), 47605(j)(1). 
 17. Public Schools Database, supra note 8. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Cal. Sch. Bd. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1298, 1318, 
1326 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the Education Code required the State Board 
to issue written findings that a statewide benefit could not be achieved through 
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for seeking county or statewide benefit status include the operator’s 
intent to open multiple school sites within a jurisdiction, or to provide 
services to populations typically served by countywide programs, 
including foster youth and students with disabilities.20 
B. Initial Authorization and Renewal 
Applicant charters in California fall primarily into two categories: 
(1) new “start-up” charters, which include single-sited schools run 
both by a group of individuals (colloquially known as “mom and pop” 
charters) and those under the supervision of charter management 
organizations (CMOs);21 and (2) traditional public schools that 
convert to charter status, or “conversion” charters.22  For proposed 
start-up charter schools, the initial petition submitted to the 
authorizer must identify the proposed location of the school and 
include the signatures of fifty percent of the parents of the potential 
student body, or fifty percent of the likely faculty (these categories 
are routinely subject to uncertainty and speculative exaggeration).23  
For conversion of a traditional public school to charter status, fifty 
percent or more of a school’s current teachers must endorse the 
petition.24  Upon receiving the petition, the school district convenes a 
public hearing on the proposed charter within thirty days, and then 
either approves or denies the charter within sixty days.25 
In order to deny a charter petition in the first instance, the 
governing board of the school district must issue written findings 
detailing the reasons for the denial.26  These findings at times 
challenge the validity of parent or faculty signatures, but are more 
likely to address the quality of the educational program, the financial 
or governance plan of the school, or the other material requirements 
of the charter petition.27 
                                                                                                                 
locally approved charters before granting state-wide benefit status; also limiting 
board discretion post-revocation measures in finding that discretion “does not 
preclude an action in mandamus to compel the board to take correction action.”). 
 20. EDUC. § 47605.5. 
 21. See id. § 47605(a)(1). 
 22. See id. § 47606. 
 23. Id. § 47605(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 24. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47606 permits that entire districts may convert to charter 
status upon approval of the petition by the Superintendent of Public Instruction and 
the State Board of Education. 
 25. EDUC. § 47605(b). 
 26. Id. § 47605(b)(1)–(5). 
 27. For further explanation, see infra app. A. 
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The primacy of local authorization is problematic for those 
interested in national or even state-level rates of charter outcomes or 
applicant characteristics.  The California Department of Education 
does not keep records of petitions denied by local school districts, and 
differences in local record-keeping make it difficult to calculate 
aggregate rates of denial in the first instance.  The matter is further 
complicated by the fact that some districts collaborate with charters 
to remedy flaws in a denied petition, actively assisting charters on the 
path toward approval, while other districts do not.28  Previous 
research estimates that ten percent of applicant charters are denied 
authorization by local school districts,29 though in light of political 
pressure favoring charter applicants this figure is likely too low. 
If approved, charters are granted a maximum term of five years, 
after which they must renew their charter with the authorizer.30  The 
renewal process is a more in-depth performance review than the 
required annual reports, and obliges charters to demonstrate 
compliance with the educational, financial, and operational criteria 
required for initial authorization.31  Student academic performance 
(as measured by the state-issued academic performance index (API) 
scores over time and by sub-group) is cited in the Education Code as 
the “most important factor” in determining renewal.32 
The legal requirement to privilege student academic performance 
during renewal and revocation proceedings has led to significant 
confusion over proper procedure when charters perform well 
academically but struggle financially or operationally.  In 2013, the 
Oakland Unified School District revoked the high performing 
American Indian Model Schools (AIMS) after a state audit found 
evidence of significant fiscal mismanagement by the schools’ former 
director.33  After the Alameda County Board of Education upheld the 
district’s decision to revoke the schools’ charter, AIMS did not wait 
for the next administrative appeal to take place before the State 
                                                                                                                 
 28. “Last year we had two denials, and then we had one that was at first denied, 
but then the Superintendent had asked that we work again with him, and then it was 
ultimately accepted.” Telephone Interview with Anonymous Employee, District 
Charter Office (July 21, 2014). 
 29. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 7. 
 30. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47607(a)(1) (West 2013).  Terms shorter than five years 
are also possible, depending on the performance record of the school in question and 
the school’s initial agreement with the authorizer. Id. 
 31. See generally EDUC. § 47607. 
 32. Id. § 47607(a)(3). 
 33. Chip Johnson, Oakland Charter School a Cautionary Tale, SFGATE (Apr. 29, 
2013), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/johnson/article/Oakland-charter-school-a-
cautionary-tale-4474075.php. 
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Board of Education, but immediately challenged the revocation in 
court.34 
The Superior Court granted AIMS a preliminary injunction, 
allowing the school to remain open pending appeal to the State Board 
of Education, and ruled that Oakland Unified did not properly 
consider the schools’ record of high academic achievement as the 
most important factor in the decision to revoke.35  Oakland’s response 
that they had considered the charters’ academic performance was 
deemed insufficient.36  This decision was upheld in American Indian 
Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School District,37 and the three 
AIMS schools continue to operate under Oakland District 
supervision.  The lack of legal guidance as to what constitutes proper 
consideration of academic criteria (particularly in light of operational 
and financial trouble) continues to flummox local school districts 
charged with charter oversight.  As a charter consultant affiliated with 
Oakland Unified who worked on the AIMS case stated: 
There are no steps, no process for showing how you [considered 
academic performance as the most important criteria].  Of course it 
was considered! It’s a really high achieving school.  We talked about 
it a lot.  There’s nothing in law that states how you consider it, or to 
prove that you considered it.  It just was considered.38 
The prolonged controversy and court involvement of the AIMS 
revocation in Oakland is not typical.  Most charter renewal actions 
are routine: they take place during regularly scheduled school board 
meetings, as the Education Code intends, not in the courtroom.  
Districts with large charter populations have dedicated office staff, 
procedures, and seasonal submission cycles to guide applicants or 
established charters through initial submission and renewal, and the 
outcome does not usually come as a shock to either party.39  Based on 
my observation, local boards of education and the State Board 
frequently rely on the researched recommendations of the charter 
support offices or personnel (at the state level, the Advisory 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. Am. Indian Model Sch. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. RG13680906 
(Alameda Cnty. Super. Ct. June 6, 2013). 
 36. Am. Indian Model Sch. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 227 Cal. App. 4th 258, 
265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (explaining the basis for the Oakland Unified School 
District’s appeal). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Telephone Interview with Charter School Consultant to Charter Authorizers 
(Sept. 23, 2014). 
 39. Id. 
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Commission on Charter Schools fills this role),40 or even the expertise 
of independent charter school consultants.41 
While written reports of these support offices are critical resources 
for busy board members, their recommendations are not always 
followed.42  In practice, authorizers have discretion to approve a 
school that has not satisfied the legal requirements or to deny one 
that has.43  This conflict between formal recommendation and board 
action, while commonly smoothed over or normalized as politically 
motivated calculation, is an important site of legal contestation and a 
place where alternative legal justifications for charter existence and 
performance emerge and gain legitimacy.  These aspects will be 
discussed in further detail later in the Article.44 
The structure of charter authorization in California provides a 
framework for a robust organizational appeals process.  Charters 
denied initial authorization at the local level may petition the relevant 
county board of education for review, and if the county upholds the 
denial, they may also appeal to the State Board of Education.45  This 
system is not without controversy: charter advocates have asked the 
courts for review boards independent from the established 
educational bureaucracy, arguing that local school boards are 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Telephone Interview with Board Member, Advisory Commission on Charter 
Schools (June 5, 2014). 
 41. A charter liaison in a suburban district in Northern California with a small 
charter population described her work as follows: 
I gather our team of experts together, and I help facilitate that process.  I 
hold the meetings; I review the charter myself.  I work with the whole team; 
we put together our recommendations, and we send them off to the board.  I 
help arrange the public hearings.  All the documents that go to the board, I 
will do a board communiqué to let the board know that it’s coming and what 
the experts have recommended. 
Telephone Interview with Charter School Liaison (July 21, 2014). 
 42. The recent approval of New Joseph Bonnheim Community Charter School by 
the Sacramento City Unified School District after district staff recommended its 
rejection, and the State Board’s renewal of Anahuacalmecac University Prep High 
School after recommended non-renewal by Los Angeles Unified School District, Los 
Angeles County Office of Education, and the advisory staff of the California 
Department of Education provide examples of instances where authorizers did not 
follow recommendations. See Approve Resolution No. 2796: Charter School Petition: 
New Joseph Bonnheim Cmty. Charter School, SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCH. 
DIST. BOARD EDUC. (June 19, 2014), http://www.scusd.edu/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/11.1_njb.pdf; Final Minutes: May 7–8, 2014, CAL. STATE. BD. OF EDUC. 
(May 8, 2014), http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/mt/ms/documents/finalminutes0708may
2014.doc. 
 43. See, e.g., supra note 42. 
 44. See infra Part III. 
 45. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(j) (West 2013). 
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structurally biased against charter schools and likely to privilege 
traditional public schools over charters in competition for scarce 
resources.46  In Today’s Fresh Start vs. Los Angeles County Office of 
Education, the California Supreme Court ruled that the current 
charter appeals process located in the existing system of K–12 
educational governance did not present an arrangement inherently 
biased against charter schools, and declined to provide the 
independent monitor requested by plaintiffs.47 
Local school boards are also keen to keep charter authorization 
and oversight squarely in their territory through relevant legal action.  
A recent appellate decision, California School Board Association v. 
State Board of Education,48 reaffirmed the presumption of local 
control of charters.  This decision required the State Board, when 
authorizing charters under state aegis, to issue written findings as to 
why these charters could not be carried out under local oversight.49  In 
a field with an increasing number of private and profit-seeking actors, 
these decisions speak directly to democratic oversight of public 
education, even as school choice and market forms gain traction 
within the educational field.50 
As with charter petitions denied in the first instance, charters 
denied renewal by the local school district may be appealed to the 
county board, to the Advisory Commission on Charter Schools 
(ACCS), and the State Board.51  These organizational appeal fora 
operate in a quasi-adversarial manner, with varying levels of formality 
and bureaucratic procedures based on geographic location and the 
size and structure of the district.52  Often, board members receive 
contested charter actions akin to appellate judges, weighing 
arguments from the charter school in question, the recommendations 
of the county or state charter support staff, and claims of the initial 
authorizer that has denied or moved to close a school.  Like appellate 
review, per the Education Code these fora are not supposed to 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Office of Educ., 57 Cal. 4th 197, 205 
(Cal. 2013). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 186 Cal. App. 4th 1298 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 49. Id. at 1318. 
 50. See BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND THE NEW 
PORTFOLIO MODELS FOR URBAN SCHOOL REFORM (Katrina E. Bulkley et al. eds., 
2010). 
 51. For more information on the role of the ACCS, see Advisory Commission on 
Charter Schools, CAL. ST. BOARD EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/cc/cs/ (last 
updated Aug. 13, 2014). 
 52. This claim is based on observation of six different charter authorizing fora. 
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consider new evidence concerning the school in question, yet 
observation of these spaces reveals that new evidence is routinely 
considered, and at times actively solicited.  For example, the adoption 
of the new state local control funding formula in 2013 cast existing 
charter school budgets and financial operation into confusion, 
requiring authorizers to skirt or ignore legal requirements regarding 
proper evidence in appeal actions to accommodate a changed policy 
environment.53  At the state level, lengthy lines of questioning 
between board members and legal counsel (for the state, authorizers, 
and charter school in question) are a common occurrence. 
C. Charter Closure 
California has a high rate of charter school closure.  Three hundred 
ninety-two charter schools have closed in the state since 1992, nearly 
twenty-five percent of the entire charter population.54  While this 
statistic does not capture the specific reasons for closure nor the 
complexities of a school’s relationship with its authorizer, it does 
indicate that many charter school experiments do end in a failure of 
sorts, with significant consequences for the students and teachers in 
those schools.  There are several common reasons for charter closure, 
which mirror the financial, operational, and educational criteria 
specified in initial charter petitions.  Charters will close if they fail to 
locate suitable facilities,55 if they cannot attract a sufficient number of 
students or qualified teachers, if they underperform academically, or 
if they are negligent in matters of school governance and operation. 
The California Department of Education (CDE) collects data on 
charter closure throughout the state, and informally identifies the 
following routes to closure:56 
                                                                                                                 
 53. The new local control funding formula represented a significant overhaul to 
the state’s school finance model and made explicit provisions for the financial 
resources of charter schools. See Local Control Funding Formula, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/aa/lc/ (last updated Jan. 27, 2015). 
 54. Public Schools Database, supra note 8. 
 55. Proposition 39, passed by California voters in 2000, reduced the level of 
democratic agreement required to pass local school district bonds from a two-thirds 
to a fifty-five percent supermajority, it also stated that “public school facilities should 
be shared fairly among all public school pupils, including those in charter schools,” 
and required districts to make reasonably equivalent facilities available for a fee to 
qualifying charters based on a projection of average daily attendance. See 
Proposition 39 and Charter Schools, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/cs/
as/proposition39.asp (last updated Feb. 11, 2015). 
 56. See Charter School Closure Process, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.
gov/sp/cs/lr/csclosurerules.asp (last updated Dec. 12, 2014). 
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1) Abandonment.  An abandoned charter received initial 
approval from its authorizer yet never opened to students.  
Common reasons for charter abandonment include an inability to 
secure start-up funds or facilities, or failure to enroll students or 
retain qualified teachers.  While abandonment of a charter does 
not directly affect students (who have not yet enrolled), it reflects 
the considerable logistical challenges faced by all new charters, and 
particularly by stand-alone schools unconnected to the resource 
base and organizational expertise of charter management 
organizations or other established charter networks. 
 
2) Voluntary Non-Renewal.  Voluntary non-renewals, the 
largest category within charter closures, occur when a school 
declines to apply for renewal upon expiration of the term.57  (For 
conversion charters, this means a return to the status of a 
traditional public school; for regular charters it means closure, or 
sometimes merger with another existing charter.)  Most voluntary 
non-renewals occur after the first five year term has elapsed; 
common reasons for non-renewal include those mentioned above, 
yet also include governance problems or problematic academic 
performance.58  It is questionable, however, how many actions in 
this category are truly voluntary decisions on the part of the 
charter. 
 
3) Denied Renewal.  This straightforward designation pertains to 
charters whose renewals have been formally denied by the 
authorizer.  As discussed previously,59 charters under local school 
district authority may pursue appeals of denials through the county 
office of education and the State Board of Education.  Since 2010, 
fewer than fifty schools have been denied renewal.60 
 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Given the frequency of communication between a school and authorizer 
required in annual reports and informal communication, many of these actions likely 
occur in the “shadow of the law,” when unfavorable academic or operational 
performance data suggest that the renewal will be denied if it moves forward.  Of the 
twenty-nine closures in 2012–2013, twenty-one were voluntary. See 2013–14 New 
Schools Press Kit, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.cal
charters.org/blog/2013/11/2013-14-new-schools-press-kit.html (follow “List of schools 
that closed in 2011–12” hyperlink located in the “More information” section). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See infra Part I.B. 
 60. Public Schools Database, supra note 8. 
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4) Revocation.  Revocation is a rare and contentious form of 
charter closure.  It occurs when an authorizer formally revokes a 
school’s charter, requiring the school to cease operations 
immediately.  The legal criteria for revocation are found in the 
Education Code, which premises revocation on written findings 
that the school: (1) materially violated any of the conditions, 
standards, or procedures set forth in the charter; (2) failed to meet 
or pursue any of the pupil outcomes identified in the charter; (3) 
engaged in fiscal mismanagement or failed to meet generally 
accepted accounting principles; or (4) violated any provision of 
law.61  In addition to these requirements, the section also states that 
academic achievement of all relevant subgroups served by the 
charter shall be the most important factor in determining whether 
or not to revoke a charter, leading to problems discussed in the 
previous section.62  While revocation is rare (and to be avoided),63 
its disruptive and often traumatic effect on students and teachers 
within these schools makes it well worth studying.  In practice 
revocation has occurred following criminal action or negligence on 
the part of the charter—including embezzlement or fraud, sexual 
abuse of students, blatant use of religious curricula, continued and 
intentional violation of proper governance practices, etc.64  Yet 
revocation also represents an irreparable breakdown in 
communication between the school and its authorizer, a departure 
from the due process protections and the usual collaborative 
orientation of school/authorizer relations. 
 
To this point, this Article has examined the legal structure and 
requirements of charter school oversight in California.  It has 
discussed the position of petitioner charter schools in relation to 
potential local, county, and state authorizers, and considered the 
frequency of and reasons for charter school closure.  Following a brief 
discussion of the project’s conceptual approach and methods in Part 
                                                                                                                 
 61. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47607(c)(1) (West 2013). 
 62. Id. § 47607(c)(2). 
 63. Telephone Interview with Charter School Lawyer (Sept. 16, 2014). 
 64. On the point of religious instruction in public charter schools, see the 
unpublished California appellate decision Liberty Family Charter Sch. v. N. 
Monterey Cnty. Unified Sch. Dist., No. H034551, 2012 WL 129821 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
12, 2012).  The charter was revoked by the local authorizer for failure to form a non-
profit corporation to administer the school, and for continued recalcitrance in using 
and purchasing religious materials as curricula.  The court also stated that the group 
lacked standing to bring an action against the district since its charter had been 
revoked and it had ceased to exist. Id. 
2015] CHARTER SCHOOL OVERSIGHT 683 
II, I examine the multiple legal aspects of charter review and their 
consequences for charter outcomes, and for public participation and 
democratic oversight. 
D. A Sociolegal Approach 
Consideration of the role of law in educational policy circles has 
been limited traditionally to the products of courthouse and 
statehouse, judicial opinions, and statutes that set the ground rules for 
local implementation.65  This project proceeds from an alternative set 
of assumptions, one that focuses on law and legal understandings 
found outside traditional legal institutions. 
A social approach to law is not a new phenomenon; generations of 
sociologists and anthropologists going back to Marx, Weber, and 
Durkheim have explored the connections between law and social 
life.66  Within the American legal academy, the legal realists of the 
early twentieth century criticized a legal scholarship that they viewed 
as overly doctrinal and instead advocated attention to the practical 
life of law.67  More recently, the law and society movement has 
brought new depth and empirical rigor to law’s social aspects, drawing 
interdisciplinary attention to the connection of law and social life by 
considering disputing practices, legal consciousness and meaning 
making, social movements, law and organizations, and many other 
topical areas.68 
These approaches remain relatively rare in the legal academy and 
in mainstream educational policy, a fact that reflects the different 
emphases and epistemologies of each field.  Investigating the social 
context of law requires social science methods not typical of doctrinal 
or normative legal inquiry, and an initial reluctance (though not 
outright refusal) to offer the prescriptive recommendations and 
evaluative commentary that characterize traditional policy analysis. 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See, e.g., MARK YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW (5th ed. 
2012). 
 66. See ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2nd 
ed. 1992). 
 67. See Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society: 
Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
409 (1998).  For a response to these schools of thought, see Richard Posner, Legal 
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986). 
 68. See Carroll Seron & Susan S. Silbey, Profession, Science, and Culture: An 
Emergent Canon of Law and Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO 
LAW AND SOCIETY 30 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). 
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Sociolegal perspectives have considerable potential to enrich the 
study of law in matters of education policy and reform.  They expand 
disciplinary boundaries and the breadth of legal source material while 
kindling debate between practitioners and academic researchers.  
They are able to uncover and to trace legal ideas lurking in 
unexpected places, far from the province of case law, statutes, and 
lawyers.  These approaches build theories of law and social life, while 
also contributing to sound policy recommendation.  The project’s 
conceptual approach takes its cue from this broadening of legal 
concern into social and organizational spaces, and approaches the 
fora of charter authorization as rich and untapped sites of law in 
action. 
II.  DATA AND METHODS 
In order to identify legal aspects of charter oversight in California, 
this project relies on three primary sources of data: (1) publicly 
available demographic and operational records of charter schools 
from the California Department of Education’s database of public 
schools;69 (2) semi-structured interviews with the parties to charter 
authorization (including lawyers, charter operators, authorizers, and 
advocacy organizations); and (3) written records of authorizer 
meetings and observation of these sites.70  While local and county 
school board meetings are not the only places in which legal ideas of 
charter oversight and accountability surface,71 they are perhaps the 
most significant, as they provide a legitimate and accessible public 
forum for relevant actors to come together to put forward and defend 
claims regarding school quality and performance. 
The first data source for the project is the California Department 
of Education database of public schools.72  Entries for charter schools 
include information on school location and the authorizing entity 
(local, county, or state level), opening date, current operational 
status, and, if relevant, the closure date, a brief statement of the 
reasons for closure, and the particular mechanism employed 
(voluntary non-renewal, denied renewal, revocation, etc.).73  I used 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Public Schools Database, supra note 8. 
 70. Sites included meetings of local school boards, county offices of education, the 
Advisory Commission on Charter Schools, and the State Board of Education. 
 71. While this project does not draw on it directly, the legislative history of 
charter-related actions would shed additional light on how charter schools came to be 
selected and privileged among other proposed educational reforms. 
 72. Public Schools Database, supra note 8. 
 73. Id. 
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the database to determine the number and characteristics of charter 
populations in the state (Appendix B),74 and to construct the universe 
of official reasons for closure and the frequency of appealed closure 
decisions (especially rich sites of law and legal contestation), as well 
as the most common closure mechanisms.  Focusing on contested or 
appealed charter actions is a methodological choice designed to 
maximize exposure to legal aspects and arguments that emerge in the 
oversight process.  While this emphasis runs the risk of normalizing 
conflict and disagreement, it permits the researcher to access the 
foundational legal motivations and arguments that undergird the 
practice of charter oversight more generally, and to uncover 
important assumptions regarding school operation and quality that 
frequently go unstated. 
The second data source consists of interviews with the parties to 
charter school authorization, which include school board members, 
charter school personnel, and lawyers representing charter schools 
and school authorizers.  This set of twelve interviews is taken from a 
larger qualitative data set focused on the legal issues of charter 
governance and school operation.  Respondents were initially 
selected at random from school and authorizer contacts provided in 
the public charter school database,75 as well as from the population of 
public sector/education law firms and advocacy organizations 
statewide.76  These contacts were supplemented by purposive 
sampling in the case of specific charter actions with higher levels of 
legal involvement (multi-level appeals through the state educational 
bureaucracy or formal legal intervention by the courts).  Particularly 
knowledgeable or experienced respondents were also selected on the 
recommendation of previous participants.77  Interview questions 
focused on the role of the respondent in both “routine” and “typical” 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Although charter schools have been operating in California since 1992, this 
project examined only the past ten years of charter actions in order to limit the 
sample and to account for major legal and policy changes to charter governance and 
oversight since that time. See generally Priscilla Wohlstetter et al., Charter Schools in 
California: A Bruising Campaign for Public School Choice, in THE CHARTER SCHOOL 
LANDSCAPE 32 (Sandra Vergari ed., 2002) (explaining the origins of the California 
charter school system). 
 75. Public Schools Database, supra note 8 (follow “Public Schools Data in 
Microsoft Excel Format” hyperlink). 
 76. Most participants requested to remain anonymous, and in written accounts or 
quotations from interviews I have referred to participants by either their role or title.  
Names of schools or districts have not been changed. 
 77. This snowball strategy was selected to target especially knowledgeable 
individuals with significant experience in the spaces of charter oversight, as well as 
with appealed actions. 
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charter actions (so judged by the respondent herself), and they 
probed the structure and practice of the authorization process, as well 
as the frequency and nature of the person’s participation in charter 
oversight actions.  Interviews were professionally transcribed and 
coded by the author using qualitative data analysis software.78  
Following from the sociolegal approach described in the previous 
section,79 coding of the qualitative data focused on references to law 
and legal ideas made in different spaces and among differently 
situated participants, with distinct legal aspects emerging over 
multiple readings. 
To supplement the interview data, I also observed charter 
oversight fora in person, including meetings of local and county 
school boards, the ACCS, and the State Board of Education.  Key 
sources in this area included meeting agendas and minutes, as well as 
formal legal sources such as the Education Code and legal decisions 
on point.  These were examined and coded for legal aspect in a 
manner similar to the interview transcriptions.80 
III.  TYPOLOGY OF LEGAL ASPECT 
Though often ambiguous and discretionary, the formal legal 
requirements of school operation clearly matter in the context of 
charter oversight.  Assertions of legality and illegality are particularly 
consequential when we consider the implications of authorizer 
decisions on communities facing the disruption of school closure.  
These formal legal requirements stipulated within the state Education 
Code and judicial opinions provide not only the basic structure of 
charter school oversight, but also the substantive and procedural 
criteria for use by local and county authorizers in approving and 
renewing applicant charter schools.81  Yet limiting the scope of inquiry 
to the formal statutory provisions neglects the alternative legal 
understandings of charter schools and education reform that bubble 
up from the communities themselves, ideas that shape the nature of 
participation, certain findings of inequality, and the tenor of oversight 
proceedings.82 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Atlas TI and Dedoose qualitative coding software were used. 
 79. See supra Part II. 
 80. See KRISTIN LUKER, SALSA DANCING INTO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: RESEARCH 
IN AN AGE OF INFO-GLUT, 198–216 (2008). 
 81. See infra app. A; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5) (West 2013). 
 82. Even procedural and substantive understandings of law in this context are ripe 
for sociolegal attention to consider the discretion, confusion, and open debate that 
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In this section, I discuss four legal aspects that emerge from 
consideration of the charter school authorization and oversight in 
California.  These legal currents appeared again and again across 
oversight fora and among diverse participants, and included 
compliance-related, legitimating, aspirational, and democratic 
strands.  These strands do not stand alone, nor are they equally 
situated.  This section identifies points of particular connection and/or 
friction, chiefly through analysis of contested charter actions.  
Ultimately, I use the divergent legal aspects to argue that the current 
oversight structure privileges the arguments of professionals and 
“repeat players” in the process, and that these imbalances have 
consequences for many applicant charter schools, as well as for the 
legitimacy of the authorizing process itself. 
While typologies are useful in building theory and identifying areas 
for future empirical inquiry,83 this section addresses specific problems 
of policy that result when these legal strands conflict with one 
another, and also considers potential solutions. 
A. Legal Aspects of Charter Oversight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Compliance 
Compliance is a central legal aspect of charter school oversight; all 
participants interviewed for this study cited compliance with the state 
Education Code and other relevant laws when asked about law in the 
context of charter oversight.  These compliance concerns encompass 
clear material and technical demands in the areas of school facilities, 
                                                                                                                 
can occur over the procedural mechanisms and substantive terms of charter 
oversight. 
 83. See D. Harold Doty & William Glick, Typologies as a Unique Form of 
Theory Building, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 230 (1994). 
legitimating compliance
Legal Aspects  
of  
charter oversight 
aspirational democratic 
688 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
financial and governance responsibilities, curriculum, instruction, and 
accountability for student academic performance. Participants’ 
accounts of compliance are confirmed by observations of the charter 
authorization sites themselves, in which charter operators routinely 
refer to specific sections of the Education Code, submit evidence and 
testimony to illustrate a school’s compliance, and even bring legal 
counsel with them to corroborate school records and fact-finding.  In 
a similar way, official district procedures for petition review, charter 
renewal, and revocation employ the regulatory language of 
compliance and compliance failure,84 downplaying the political and 
personal aspects of the process in favor of a highly rational and 
technical compliance with the law. 
Compliance concerns also flow both ways.  Charters must 
demonstrate to authorizers that they meet relevant requirements, yet 
they are eager to hold authorizers accountable for fair process and the 
proper consideration due them.85  While authorizers at all levels voice 
concerns about their own internal processes,86 local school boards are 
the first stop for applicant charter schools.  My observational data of 
local boards reveal multiple instances of significant authorizer 
confusion in the face of legal arguments put forward by charter 
schools.  Board members have wondered out loud in public hearings 
what the law actually requires for charter petitions and renewals, and 
they routinely route complicated compliance questions to district or 
state staff, legal counsel, representatives of charter advocacy groups, 
and even members of the general public in attendance.87 
Persisting confusion over what constitutes proper compliance is 
understandable, given the vague and discretionary language of many 
legal provisions of charter operation.  Consider, for example, what it 
                                                                                                                 
 84. While compliance language is perhaps expected when things go awry, legal 
compliance is also emphasized from the very beginning of the charter process.  As the 
Los Angeles Unified School District stated in a memo to applicant charters planning 
to submit an initial charter: “the charter schools division will determine whether the 
charter school petition is likely to be successfully implemented . . . and ascertain 
whether the proposed charter school will be run in a financially, operationally, and 
educationally sound manner.” L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., CHARTER SCHOOL 
GOVERNING BOARD MEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE (2013), available at http://notebook.
lausd.net/pls/ptl/url/ITEM/B7193A6E718F3032E0430A0002103032. 
 85. This concern was voiced by all of the charter principals who were interviewed 
for the project.  Many principals complained that no one from the authorizing district 
or California Department of Education ever visited their school. 
 86. See, e.g., Meeting of the Advisory Commission on Charter Schools, 
Sacramento, CA (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://cde-ca.granicus.com/Transcript
Viewer.php?view_id=4&clip_id=122. 
 87. Id. 
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means to comply with the charge to grant charters consistent with 
“sound educational practice” or to evaluate potential charters based 
on their future or imagined ability to “successfully implement the 
program set forth in the petition.”88  The Education Code requires 
applicant charters to state in their petition “what it means to be an 
educated person in the 21st century” and detail “how learning best 
occurs,”89 yet it then charges authorizers to evaluate petitions and 
requests for renewal almost exclusively on projected or achieved 
academic performance.90  As the experience of the American Indian 
Model Schools in Oakland illustrates, the explicit requirement to 
privilege a school’s projected or achieved academic performance in 
approving or renewing a charter or renewal raises serious questions 
about the consideration due to legal requirements in other areas, and 
how authorizers are meant to understand and evaluate financial and 
operational data alongside academic performance. 91 
Authorizer discretion also extends to the procedural requirements 
of charter oversight.  I witnessed several appeals of charter denials 
that reached the ACCS, the body that advises and recommends 
actions regarding charters to the State Board of Education.  When 
reviewing charter denials or revocations on appeal, the ACCS is 
technically prevented from considering new facts (similar to the 
limitations faced by appellate courts), but must focus deliberation on 
the testimony and procedure that transpired at local and county-level 
hearings.  Yet based on my observation, the ACCS routinely 
considered new facts: permitting schools to update financial 
information and school enrollment estimates, and to offer new 
thoughts from school and community leaders.92  While members of 
                                                                                                                 
 88. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(1)–(2) (West 2013). 
 89. Id. § 47605(b)(5)(A)(i). 
 90. After the passage of California Senate Bill 1290 in 2012, Section 47607(a)(3) 
of the Education Code was amended to read, “[t]he authority that granted the 
charter shall consider increases in pupil academic achievement for all groups of pupils 
served by the charter school as the most important factor in determining whether to 
grant a charter renewal.” CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47607(a)(3)(A) (West 2013).  
Acceptable metrics for increases in student performance are detailed in 47607(b). See 
Id. § 47607(b). 
 91. Am. Indian Model Sch. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 227 Cal. App. 4th 258, 
270–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
 92. There is evidence that discretion supports even more departure from the law 
in local contexts.  As one state official related: 
I’ve seen this happen in many cases—the districts say, “We don’t care what 
the law says, we’ve got a bunch of constituents that are angry about charter 
schools being so prevalent.  So we’re going to deny based on the fact that 
there is a group of constituents angry about the large impact of charter 
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the commission voiced concern over the legality of this extended 
consideration (evidenced by lengthy back and forth between board 
members and legal counsel on both sides), it was their discretion to 
accept or reject these updates, with clear implications both for the 
charter and local authorizers in question.93 
Local school board members, particularly in districts with 
significant charter populations, rely heavily on the research and 
recommendation of charter office support staff to assess compliance 
and to inform resulting decisions on charter actions.94  In the 
authorizing meetings I observed, a district staff person was frequently 
present to interpret the recommendations and answer questions for 
the board; legal counsel was also present (and held a prominent role 
in state-level fora and for actions on higher appeal).  Larger districts 
in Los Angeles, San Diego, and Oakland have special divisions 
dedicated to charter oversight, though most authorizers oversee a 
small number of charters and rely on one or two charter point people 
and more informal board procedures for receiving charter 
testimony.95  The variable structure of charter oversight across the 
state has consequences both for applicant charters and for the legal 
cast of the process: the routines of larger districts streamline yet 
formalize the process (inviting and sometimes requiring professional 
legal participation), while smaller districts deal with charter oversight 
more informally, on a case by case basis where formal legal 
representation might appear strangely out of character.96 
                                                                                                                 
schools on the district . . . .”  I can tell you that you hear this on a regular 
basis. 
Telephone Interview with Comm’r, Advisory Comm’n on Charter Sch., and 
Principal, Anonymous Cal. Charter Sch. (June 5, 2014). 
 93. See State Board of Education Meeting, CAL. ST. BOARD EDUC. (May 7, 2014), 
http://cde-ca.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=135. 
 94. Telephone Interview with Charter School Consultant to Charter Authorizers 
(Sept, 23, 2014). 
 95. See, e.g., Charter Schools Division, L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., available at 
http://lausd.schoolwires.net/page/397 (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 96. As one principal stated: 
It would absolutely be odd [if lawyers came to the meetings]. . . .  I think the 
superintendent would be shocked if we brought in a lawyer.  She’d probably 
ask me why we’re wasting our money, because they really wanted to 
sponsor us.  There was a school up here that at one point, the 
superintendent recommended not renewing and the board went against her 
and voted them in.  That was mostly due to very small enrollment, financials 
that were in dire straits.  They’re still hanging on, but it’s by a thread.  I 
don’t think that was an issue of we don’t want charters.  I think it was more 
specifically that I’m not sure this charter is going to survive. 
Telephone Interview with Principal, Anonymous rural Nevada Cnty. Charter Sch. 
(Aug. 22, 2014). 
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The story of charter oversight as primarily one of rational 
compliance with clear legal requirements is challenged by the fact of 
ambiguous law relevant to charters and by the natural variation in 
process and local custom found among 332 individual charter 
authorizers.97  Yet emphasis on compliance in the formal record 
minimizes the legal discretion in charter actions and downplays the 
variation empirically observed.  The compliance strand has the 
additional effect of reifying material inequalities between participants 
and legitimating the arguments of some groups over others, 
phenomena discussed in the following sections. 
2. Legitimating 
The second legal aspect to emerge from charter school oversight is 
that of law as a legitimating and finite resource.  In this sense, law and 
legal arguments confer material advantages on charter schools with 
the resources and sophistication to access them, and thus privilege the 
position and arguments of some groups over others.  This legal aspect 
encompasses the professional knowledge base and experience of the 
charter school board, as well as the school’s social network and ability 
to afford legal counsel and support services.  Use of law and legal 
language in oversight fora thus signal certain resources; professional 
and organizational sophistication; and general competence on the 
part of charter operators and the specific charter school in question. 
Interviews with charter operators reveal a spectrum of schools’ 
relationships to law in this context: renewal packets accomplished 
months in advance and the in-house legal teams of CMOs contrast 
sharply with the experience of many individual charters, who hire 
lawyers only to handle serious actions such as denied renewals or 
revocations, if at all, and who even resort to last-minute Internet 
searching of the legal criteria for authorization or renewal 
requirements.98  The prominence of “voluntary closures” within the 
larger category of charter closures illustrates one important 
consequence of this legal and material disparity: struggling or under-
resourced schools who cannot afford to commit fully to the 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 7. 
 98. “I started to talk to legal counsel early on in January and ask them—make 
sure that everything we need to change or write or whatnot meets the legal 
requirement.  That was the primary charge to the legal team.” Interview with Board 
President, Anonymous Charter School that was denied renewal (June 27, 2014). 
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adversarial process of contesting potential closures may be actively 
discouraged from trying.99 
Advocacy organizations recognize that legal assistance is critical to 
the success of both the petitioner and established charter schools, and 
they have attempted to fill the gap by providing legal plans and 
services for their members (even offering pro bono representation to 
charters serving disadvantaged populations).100  Yet these 
organizations have their own agendas, which include maintaining and 
growing their reputations as legal experts in authorizer decisions, 
advocating for state-level policy change, and “replicating and scaling 
up” high performing charters and charter networks.101  Stepping into 
the role of “Civil Gideon” for struggling charter schools would likely 
compromise many of these positions. 
The legitimating aspect of law can also be seen in the structure of 
charter oversight fora themselves, and particularly in the deference 
shown to lawyers and legal arguments in these spaces.  In the 
contested charter actions I observed, lawyers for both charter schools 
and school districts were received far more positively and with greater 
attention by board members, evidenced by the frequency and 
substance of follow-up questions from the board to lawyers following 
presentation, in the extension of time limits for their testimony, and 
by the level of follow-up cross talk between the board, staff, and legal 
representatives. 
By contrast, public testimony from parents, students, and 
community members was always time-limited and received passively 
by the board members.  Despite formal legal protections to ensure 
community input and voice in charter decisions, board members did 
not engage or question individuals during public comment,102 and they 
seemed to distance themselves from the pathos and public display of 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See Charter School Closures Fiscal Year 2013–14, CAL. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/cs/lr/chclosures1314.asp (last updated Feb. 4, 2015). 
 100. The California Charter Schools Association (CCSA) and the Charter School 
Development Center (CSDC) offer legal help and templates for member schools.  
CCSA maintains a legal defense fund and offers grants to fund items such as 
incorporation expenses. See Legal Defense Fund, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N, 
http://www.calcharters.org/advocacy/legal/ldf.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
 101. For an example of an organization advocating for policy change, see CCSA 
Calls for the Closure of 6 Charter Schools as a Result of Academic 
Underperformance, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.cal
charters.org/blog/2013/12/ccsa-calls-for-the-closure-of-6-charter-schools-as-a-result-
of-academic-underperformance.html. 
 102. Exceptions to this statement are considered infra Part III.A.3, concerning the 
aspirational aspects of law in charter oversight. 
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emotion this portion of the meeting frequently inspired.103  In the 
board meetings I observed, public comment was also typically set 
apart from the business portion of meetings, thus decontextualized 
from the administrative consideration and decision-making that came 
both before and after. 
An understanding of law and legal argument as lending legitimacy 
to those able to purchase and employ it is certainly not new,104 yet in 
the case of charter oversight it raises questions about the depth of 
commitment to democratic participation in these actions, as well as 
the proper register of argument for debate about school reform.  
While this strand makes clear that legal concerns are respected and 
understood by authorizers, it opens the door to more normative 
questions of public participation in decision-making: what value 
should authorizers ascribe to the experiences of parents and students 
in failed or denied charter schools?  How could the focus on 
compliance better accommodate local knowledge and alternative 
sources of authority?105 
3. Aspirational 
A third legal aspect present in charter oversight actions involves 
the aspirational use of law, primarily by teachers, parents, and 
students in charter schools.  Although there is an aspirational, even 
hortatory cast to all legal argument, this legal aspect reaches beyond 
competing interpretations of charter policy or technical issues of 
compliance.  By claiming new rights and resurrecting old ones not 
recognized by courts (such as the right to equal school funding or the 
right to choose a particular charter school), these individuals address 
foundational questions of school governance as well as the communal 
project of public education. 
The language of rights and discrimination is particularly common 
in actions involving potential charter closure, yet the framework also 
critiques accountability practices more generally, decoupled from any 
                                                                                                                 
 103. This finding was most evidenced in transitions between meeting sections.  
Professional staff at times left the room during public comment, and transitions back 
to board motions and official recommendations were punctuated by statements that 
set apart student, community, and teacher experience from school oversight—“okay 
then,” “back to business,” etc. 
 104. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). 
 105. One answer to these questions may be glimpsed in the new LCFF model, 
which requires school districts to incorporate sustained local input and co-creation of 
goals through the Local Control Accountability Plan (LCAP). See Local Control 
Funding Formula, supra note 53. 
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action affecting a specific school.  A few examples from the data will 
illustrate these points. 
A student in a Los Angeles charter school that was denied renewal 
by the local district and county traveled with fellow parents and 
students to Sacramento to attend the appeal hearing before the State 
Board of Education.106  During public comment he related his 
experience in traditional public schools, where he struggled due to his 
status as a special education student and English language learner.107  
Imploring the Commission to renew his school’s charter, he departed 
from a prepared statement to state his rights as he understood them: 
I have the right to be a Native American. I have a right to learn 
addition. I have a right to learn my own culture. I have a right to 
dignity. I have a right to graduate. I have a right to go to college. 
And I have a right to pick my own school, and I pick this school. 
And that’s why I want you to renew our charter.108 
Parents and community members present at the hearing criticized 
the charter oversight process as systematically biased against poor 
communities of color, citing discrimination against Native Americans 
as the reason for their school’s denial by the local district and 
county.109  Current educational oversight policies, they argued, do not 
respect the rights of ethnic minorities and the need for diverse forms 
of instruction in these communities.110 
Aspirational statements such as these do not constitute formal legal 
claims, and they are unlikely to result in large-scale policy change.  
Yet when offered in the context of authorizer hearings, they suggest a 
proto-form of legal mobilization and reflect a common legal 
consciousness well worth attending to.  When spoken aloud, these 
statements can have measurable consequences: altering the form and 
tenor of oversight proceedings and at times influencing specific 
decisions made there.  In the aforementioned meeting of the State 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See State Board of Education Meeting, supra note 93. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  During the period of public comment before the State Board of 
Education, many individuals affiliated with the charter school in question—including 
teachers, students, parents, lawyers, and community members—expressed a variety 
of legal opinions regarding the denial of the school’s charter, both by the district and 
the County Office of Education. See id.  These ranged from accusations of due 
process violation to charges of racism and decades of discrimination resulting in 
neglect of a population in need. See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  From two parents: “Discrimination by Los Angeles Unified School 
District and Los Angeles County Office of Education is why we are here today.” Id.  
From two students: “Please find it in your hearts, look deep in your hearts.  I don’t 
want to say prejudices, but often they are because we are not aware of them.” Id. 
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Board regarding the Los Angeles charter school, for example, board 
members adopted a noticeably more accommodating and 
collaborative stance toward the school’s case after public comment, 
minimizing the previous conflict and seeking common ground.111  
After the student’s emotional testimony, a member of the State 
Board responded with the following: 
There have been lots of conversations about this school, and lots of 
conversations about the importance of their mission—both from a 
cultural perspective as well as an academic perspective . . . what 
came out of that was perhaps a route toward common ground.  A 
route that would provide an opportunity for this school to continue 
to educate children in this interesting and profound way, but also for 
us to feel comfortable about the technical bits and pieces—about 
running charter school successfully in this day and age . . . . This 
motion is about trying to find the sweet spot between what will 
make this board and the Department of Education feel good about 
the compliance of this school and at the same time give them a 
chance to move forward.112 
Aspirational references to law are also made in oversight spaces by 
parties not directly involved in the charter action in question.  
Representatives of teachers’ unions attend charter hearings to speak 
against the petition or renewal of a specific charter school (and the 
spread of charter schools in general) in the name of preserving 
traditional public education and core values of democratic 
accountability.113  Local community organizations and groups like the 
“Brown Berets” (a Chicano activist group that also advocates for 
educational equity) offer a more radical critique of process, 
advocating the full replacement of a broken legal and education 
system that fails large numbers of poor Latino children.114  Members 
of charter advocacy organizations such as the California Charter 
Schools Association occasionally give public testimony in an 
aspirational manner (what the law may one day be), yet these 
                                                                                                                 
 111. This was an unusual occurrence (particularly when compared to the reception 
of similar testimony at the local school district and county level), and also contrasts 
with implications of legal aspects presented elsewhere in this Article. 
 112. State Board of Education Meeting, supra note 106. 
 113. For an example of these views, see the California Teachers Association’s 
statement on charter schools, with particular emphasis on their framing of charters as 
innovations that emphasize meaningful local participation. Issues & Action: Charter 
Schools, CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, http://www.cta.org/en/Issues-and-Action/Education-
Improvement/Charter-Schools.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
 114. Mary Romero, Brown is Beautiful, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 211, 215–16 (2005). 
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established organizations are more likely to receive deference from 
the board and a more prominent place on the board’s agenda.115 
While the effects of aspirational legal claims on charter decisions 
are worthy of additional empirical attention, preliminary evidence 
suggests that they may diffuse the adversarial orientation of the 
process while reminding authorizers of the values of fairness and 
equal participation. 
4. Democratic 
The fourth legal aspect to emerge in this study is the democratic 
character of law, and specifically law as retaining local control over 
public education.  This aspect exists in considerable tension with 
trends in the current organizational environment of educational 
reform and charter school operation: strong state legislative support 
for charter growth through non-profit and for-profit actors, increased 
autonomy of charters, and the growing influence of market ideas on 
school operation and reform.116  The democratic aspect surfaced in the 
data in many ways: in the formal legal disputes requiring court 
involvement,117 in the aforementioned public testimony in charter 
hearings, and also in interviews with lawyers for school district 
authorizers, who reaffirmed the strong desire of their district and 
county clients to keep charter approval in their purview.118 
The democratic aspect of law in this context pushes back against 
charter advocates’ claims that discretionary legal language in the 
Education Code can easily accommodate fundamental reforms to the 
structures of school accountability.119  It also provides a battery of 
arguments for charter advocacy organizations when arguing for 
                                                                                                                 
 115. This claim is based on observational evidence of six charter authorizing fora, 
and an in-depth review of several charter denials that progressed from local and 
county boards to the State Board. See generally Michael M. Amir et al., Charter 
Fights, L.A. LAW., July-Aug. 2008, at 24. 
 116. BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND THE NEW 
PORTFOLIO MODELS FOR URBAN SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 50. 
 117. See, e.g., Today’s Fresh Start v. L.A. Cnty. Office of Educ., 57 Cal. 4th 197 
(Cal. 2013); Cal. Sch. Bd. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1298 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 118. See Telephone Interview with Charter School Lawyer (Sept. 11, 2014); 
Telephone Interview with Charter School Lawyer (Sept. 16, 2014); Telephone 
Interview with Charter School Consultant to Charter Authorizers (Sept. 23, 2014). 
 119. These claims are voiced in many of the advocacy activities of state-wide 
charter organizations, including the CCSA.  To see these arguments used in legal 
cases, see Cal. Sch. Bd. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1298 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010), and Am. Indian Model Sch. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 227 Cal. App. 
4th 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
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reforms that restructure traditional democratic authority over 
schools: reforms to decouple charter oversight from the existing 
system of educational governance, or to create independent review 
boards to distribute resources, assess charter quality, and review 
appeals. 
Yet charter advocacy organizations and charter networks also rely 
on democratic arguments to bolster legitimacy and deflect the critique 
that they seek to dismantle public institutions.120  Advocates claim 
that charters reflect true democratic localism by fulfilling the 
community’s desire for increased educational choice.121  In this view, 
long waiting lists for charter schools in certain areas are evidence of 
public desire for school options and dissatisfaction with the 
bureaucratic forms of educational governance.  Advocates for 
expanding charter schools thus frame decentralized governance as the 
democratic answer to an unresponsive educational system. 
The legal aspects identified in this section are not mutually 
exclusive, nor are the boundaries between them always clearly 
distinguishable.  After all, certain actors reap the benefits of legal 
connections and resources while simultaneously touting the 
democratic orientation of the process; charter operators make 
aspirational rights claims while attending to the material 
requirements of compliance.  Nor do all local school boards receive 
each of these legal arguments in the same way—district size, location, 
and historical experience with the charter form are important 
variables to think about when considering the role of law and legal 
argument in charter oversight.122 
CONCLUSION 
Charter oversight takes place in a complicated legal environment 
and dynamic social field. This paper has sought the role of law within 
the established school oversight structure, and has examined the 
diversity of legal argument that emerges.  The rough typology of legal 
aspect presented here—encompassing compliance-related, 
legitimating, aspirational, and democratic elements—reveals charter 
oversight to be considerably more than a tiered bureaucratic process 
focused on rational, technical compliance with the letter of the law.  
In practice, charter oversight spaces entertain many types of legal 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Telephone Interview with Dir., CMO (June 17, 2014); Telephone Interview 
with Principal, Anonymous L.A. Charter Sch. (June 5, 2014). 
 121. Telephone Interview with Dir., supra note 120; Telephone Interview with 
Principal, supra note 120. 
 122. Vergari, supra note 5. 
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argument from professional and non-professional sources, and as such 
are fertile sites of informal legal mobilization both for and against 
traditional forms of educational governance and current reform 
logics. 
An expanded attention to law in charter oversight regimes has 
considerable implications for sound charter and school choice policy.  
When state legislatures pass legislation or when local school boards 
adopt policy guidelines regarding charter oversight criteria, they 
should consider carefully the implications of multiple, weighted 
elements for evaluation, as well as the potential effects of 
discretionary statutory language on the project of local interpretation.  
Since charter oversight is likely to remain the responsibility of local 
school districts, greater clarity concerning the recognized sources of 
authority in public hearings, participation by the affected community, 
and consideration of appealed decisions are necessary.  Also, local, 
county, and state boards of education ought to consider implementing 
procedural protections in the charter appeals process in order to level 
the playing field between well-resourced charter management 
organizations and stand-alone charter schools. 
Legislatures and local boards of education must also consider what 
should happen when the bureaucratic appeals process is interrupted 
by court intervention, as well as how they might exercise democratic 
control over charters in ways beyond the traditional memoranda of 
understanding or the divisive, “nuclear option” of revocation.123  Clear 
policies governing the participation of third parties in authorization 
and appeal spaces (lawyers, charter advocacy organizations, teachers 
unions, and private foundations) are necessary to provide consistency 
and to ensure a fair hearing for all charter schools facing board action. 
While charter oversight mechanisms outside California are beyond 
the scope of this paper, recent experiments in expanding authorizing 
and oversight power to mayors and universities raise additional 
questions about the role of law and the viability of traditional 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Interviews with school district personnel and charter lawyers reveal them to 
be especially keen for policy that more clearly defines the relationship between 
authorization and problems meriting non-renewal or revocation: 
The law doesn’t give the district any hammer to do anything except 
revocation.  The district can’t go in and make changes . . . and you can 
understand why district might want to do that — you’re displacing a lot of 
kids, and families are going to be upset . . .  Lots of districts are hesitant to 
push that nuclear button [of revocation].  It’s very frustrating from the 
authorizer perspective that there are no other steps that can be taken. 
Telephone Interview with Charter School Consultant to Charter Authorizers (Sept. 
23, 2014). 
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democratic oversight in an increasingly hybridized educational 
system.124  Increased empirical attention to these governance 
innovations and their efficacy, as well as to the oversight structures 
employed in other states, will clarify the law’s role in current charter 
school educational reforms, and will assist lawmakers and school 
officials in developing a charter policy that respects local autonomy 
and addresses the critical matter of charter quality and performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 124. New York City, Milwaukee, and Indianapolis are three cities that have 
experimented with mayoral authorization of charter schools, and twelve states have 
institutions of higher education as authorizers of K–12 charter schools. See State-by-
State Authorizer Contact Information Map, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CHARTER SCH. 
AUTHORIZERS, http://public.tableausoftware.com/views/NACSAAuthorizerContact
Information91914/Map?amp;:embed=y&:display_count=no&:showVizHome=no 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2015). 
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APPENDIX A 
Required Elements of a Charter Petition in California125 
1. A description of the educational program of the school.  If the 
proposed charter school will serve high school pupils, a description of 
how the charter school will inform parents about the transferability of 
courses to other public high schools and the eligibility of courses to 
meet college entrance requirements must be included in the charter 
petition. 
2. The measurable pupil outcomes identified for use by the 
school. 
3. The method by which pupil progress in meeting those pupil 
outcomes is to be measured. 
4. The schools governance structure, including parental 
involvement. 
5. The qualifications to be met by individuals employed by the 
school. 
6. Procedures to ensure health and safety of pupils and staff. 
7. The means by which the school will achieve racial and ethnic 
balance among its pupils, reflective of the general population residing 
in the district. 
8. Admission requirements, if applicable. 
9. The manner in which annual financial audits will be conducted, 
and the manner in which audit exceptions and deficiencies will be 
resolved. 
10. The procedures by which pupils may be suspended or expelled. 
11. Provisions for employee coverage under the State Teachers 
Retirement System, the Public Employees Retirement System, or 
federal social security. 
12. The public school alternatives for pupils residing within the 
district who choose not to attend charter schools. 
13. A description of the rights of any employee of the school 
district upon leaving the employment of the school district to work in 
a charter school, and of any rights of return to the school district after 
employment at a charter school. 
14. A dispute resolution process. 
15. A declaration whether or not the charter school will be the 
exclusive public school employer of the charter school employees. 
16. The procedures to be used if the charter school closes. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5) (West 2013). 
2015] CHARTER SCHOOL OVERSIGHT 701 
APPENDIX B 
California Charter School Operational Status, 2010–2015126 
Year 
Total 
Charters
Opened Closed 
2010–2011 912 115 27 
2011–2012 982 100 28 
2012–2013 1063 109 29 
2013–2014 1130 104 34 
2014–2015 1184 87 n/a 
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES WITH LARGEST CHARTER POPULATIONS, 
2015127 
County Number of Charters
Number of 
Authorizers 
Los Angeles 373 29 
San Diego 127 29 
Santa Clara 59 12 
Sonoma 56 26 
Alameda 52 10 
Sacramento 48 14 
San Joaquin 40 11 
San Bernardino 38 20 
Fresno 26 14 
Riverside 25 15 
 
                                                                                                                 
 126. 2010–11 New Schools Press Kit, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.ccsa.org/blog/2010/11/new-schools-press-kit.html; 2011–12 New Schools 
Press Kit, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.ccsa.org/blog/2011/
11/2011-12-new-schools-press-kit.html; 2012–13 New Schools Press Kit, CAL. 
CHARTER SCH. ASS’N (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.ccsa.org/blog/2012/10/2012-13-new-
schools-press-kit.html; 2013–14 New Schools Press Kit, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N 
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.ccsa.org/blog/2013/11/2013-14-new-schools-press-kit.html; 
2014–15 New Schools Press Kit, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N (Nov. 17, 2014), http://
www.ccsa.org/blog/2014/11/2014-15-new-schools-press-kit.html; California Charter 
Schools by the Numbers, CAL. CHARTER SCH. ASS’N, http://www.calcharters.org/
understanding/numbers/.  
 127. Information collated in February 2015 from Charter Schools Database, CAL. 
DEP’T EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/si/cs/ap/lists.asp (last modified Apr. 10, 2013).  
